The question of secession has recently become particularly topical in light of the twin independence referendums in Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan. Whilst the history and geopolitical situation of both regions is hugely different, at the heart of both referendums is a shared principle; that it is legitimate and right for a body of people to, by majority vote, declare themselves independent of the political entity to which they presently belong.
Catalonia and Kurdistan are not unique in holding to this view. Indeed, this view of sovereignty and secession seems to have been in the ascendancy for the last sixty years or so; it has formed the crux of arguments for decolonisation, and is generally accepted by the international community, hence the UN’s support for referendums on ‘self-determination’ in South Sudan or East Timor, or indeed the British government’s decision to permit a referendum on Scottish independence in 2014.
This view of secession, however, has multiple flaws. The most important of these – in fact, the one upon which the others are predicated – is the fallacious assumption that popular opinion can affect the fundamental essence of a nation. According to this line of argument, there is no thing which cannot be altered if a sufficient number of people approve of the alteration, up to and including the character of a country as manifested in its borders.
The flaw here is that popular opinion can never be more than a snapshot, a freeze-frame of what the majority of the people think at a certain point in time. To rely upon that in deciding questions of sovereignty is to ossify that one moment for all of eternity. This is patently absurd; popular opinion is as mutable as the tides, and with regards to sovereignty particularly there is often considerable change – one example might be the enthusiastic vote in 1974 for Britain to join the European Union, followed by the vote in 2017 to leave it.
Taken to its extreme, this position seems to imply that secession is an inevitability which merely needs to be ‘ratified’ by asking the same question over and over again until the people can be worn down. An example of this is the present situation in Scotland; the Scottish people voted against independence in 2014, yet Scottish nationalists are already agitating for a second vote. Even if a second such referendum were not held imminently, it is almost certain that it will take place at some point. Such a system is grounded in the belief of an elite that secession must happen; it is the people’s fault for not voting for it, and they must be pressed again and again for a ‘correct’ response.
Beyond this, there is a further objection. Secession is often presented as something which only affects the seceders, but in reality to secede is to create two new polities – the new state and a remaining rump. This is often a profound alteration of the national identity of the rump; for instance, Catalonia has been central to Spanish culture for centuries, and contains much of the historical heritage of the wider Spanish nation. Equally there may be economic imperatives at stake; Iraq’s wealth is staked on its hydrocarbon deposits, of which a great amount are located in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Surely, then, when secession entails such a great alteration to the condition of both entities, it is only right that a vote take place (if it take place at all; see above) across the entirety of the initial state? And that the consent of a majority in both polities be required for secession to be actualised? But even here we see the absurdities of predicating sovereignty on popular opinion. What if secession is only approved by a slim majority? What if only by a single vote? Is it then the case that the views of the minority, even if that majority constitute 49.9% of the populace, be disregarded? Such aggressive majoritarianism seems a profoundly instable way to ground sovereignty.
The logical conclusion of the belief in self-determination as justifying secession is individual independence; a dystopic libertarian scenario in which each individual might declare independence purely out of dislike of his neighbours or the prospect of being ruled over by someone else. If all that matters is opinion, then we end up in such a nightmarish situation.
Of course, none of this should be construed to suggest a total opposition to secession per se. There are a variety of situations in which secession is justifiable; one is particularly minded of instances where peaceful co-existence between two groups seems impossible, and the only pragmatic solution is to divide them into two states. The partition of the Palestine mandate in 1948 is one such situation; equally the implosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
But the situation in Catalonia and Kurdistan is not similar to either of these. In Catalonia, Catalans have prospered under Spanish rule for centuries, and presently enjoy a very generous political and economic settlement. Similarly in Kurdistan, the current compact between Erbil and Mosul allows the Kurds profound autonomy. In both cases, one suspects that the motivation behind secession is more likely the ambition of nationalist elites than a general will of the people.
The essence of a state is not something which should be set in stone; states evolve and change along with their societies. But those who suggest that secession can be effected by a mere referendum are risking fundamentally altering the national identity of two peoples on the flimsiest of grounds. Both the Catalans and the Kurds should proceed with caution.
Donald Trump is not a normal politician. That, at least, both his detractors and supporters agree on. To the former, it’s a sign of his dangerous unpredictability and callow inexperience; to the latter, a token of his status as one unaffected by the rot of the Washington bubble. But if that’s what he’s not, the question remains of what he is.
To answer that, we must journey back in time long before a Trump presidency was ever anything other than a punchline to a particularly bad joke. For before Trump the politician, there was Trump the businessman; the blond-haired bruiser from New York’s Midtown, clad in a sharp suit, beautiful supermodel in tow, butting heads with rivals across boardrooms. Times may have changed, the tawdry glitz of Trump Tower may have been exchanged for the grandeur of the White House, but at heart Donald J. Trump is best understood as a businessman.
Seeing him as this rather than a politician helps explain much that is bewildering about him. Trump is not bound by the conventions that politicians are normally constrained by; the expectations to speak truthfully, to fulfil promises, to act in a measured way. Businessmen have no truck with any of this. A Manhattan real estate investor, sitting across a table from his competitors, doesn’t act like a politician; he curses at them and cajoles them, he slams the table, he insults them, and eventually he wins.
All the bombast of Trump – all the gratuitous offensiveness, the rude tweets, the childish appellations he attaches to his rivals (of which ‘Crooked Hillary’ and ‘Lying Ted’ are the highlights) should be seen through this lens – as a posture Trump adopts in order to help him win. He doesn’t even seem to believe much of it; witness how fast the vitriol directed at Ben Carson, for instance, was replaced by the warm embrace of an offer of a job on his campaign. We’ve all been taken in by the act of a showman.
But this act extends to far more than Trump’s pugnacious demeanour. Far too many people – on both sides of the political spectrum – were taken in by Trump’s grandiose statements of policy during the campaign. Perhaps reasonably, they viewed them as they viewed policy announcements by prior politicians – that is to stay, statements of intent that, if elected, he would follow through on.
With the benefit of hindsight, though, their true nature becomes clear. They were not statements but opening gambits in negotiations. Take Trump’s so-called ‘Muslim ban.’ Trump made his ‘offer’ to the American people, so to speak, with his call for ‘a complete and total shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.’ The reaction was mostly shock and disgust – but the initial bid had been made.
Upon Trump’s election as President, opposing ‘offers’ were made in the form of vociferous opposition both Congressional and judicial. What took place next – the wrangling between Trump and various judges – might be termed the ‘negotiations’, much as an aggressive property developer might argue with a tenant over a disputed term in a contract. What eventually emerged was a travel ban that is, by all sane accounts, very reasonable – common-sense, time-limited restrictions on emigration from a handful of notoriously dangerous countries.
This isn’t how politicians operate; it’s precisely how businessmen do. No self-respecting businessman worth his salt will walk into negotiations and state the price he wants, knowing that the cut and thrust of negotiations will drive it down. Instead he names a figure twice as high as he wants, knowing the response will be half as much as he wants. Through slow back-and-forth argumentation, eventually the two parties arrive at a price both consider ‘fair.’ It’s an almost dialectical style of governing, one which has never really been tried before.
The same applies with Trump’s flagship policy – fighting illegal immigration. When Trump started talking about building ‘a big beautiful wall with Mexico’ and repealing DACA, he almost certainly never wanted to do anything of the sort. Instead, he was seeking to do two things; firstly to make illegal immigration (by all accounts a genuine issue) part of the national debate, and also to make an extreme initial demand, knowing that he’ll never get it but that negotiations are now open.
Upon his election, Trump immediately faced pushback from liberal voices in Congress. What most failed to realise was that Trump intended for this to happen. Trump is not a moron; he employs many undocumented workers himself, and recognises that a blanket deportation would be economically damaging to the country. But by demanding a huge amount initially, he was able to pull negotiations in his favour and eventually conclude an agreement with Democratic leadership which meant that key provisions of DACA would be kept in place, with funding for a wall highly unlikely.
One of the few people who understood all this about him was the Democrat who worked alongside him on hammering out this deal, Chuck Schumer. Schumer, like Trump, is a New Yorker, and like all New Yorkers he’s steeped in the commerciality of that city. He recognises Trump for what he is; a negotiator willing to brawl a bit to get the deal he wants. Though politically he seems the antithesis of Trump, Schumer is more similar to the man than many realise. Neither are beyond a bit of chest-thumping and posturing, but fundamentally both are nothing more than negotiators. By all accounts the two have a good personal rapport – an indication that Trump’s aggressively partisan demeanour is an artfully-constructed artifice.
‘We are not wholly bad or good,’ Dylan Thomas reminds us. The same might be said to hold true for Donald Trump. It’s beyond dispute that he’s a thin-skinned sexist who will do or say pretty much anything to attain wealth and power. It’s also true that politically he’s proving to be far more nuanced than anyone had assumed. He has at least three more years left (and, who knows, perhaps even seven) and the world would be advised to prepare themselves for more surprises.
There are two fairly inevitable things about two-party systems. First, that there will be perennial discussion of the creation of third parties. Secondly, that in the end pretty much nothing will upturn the two-party status quo.
James Chapman, the former Special Advisor to the hapless David Davies, is the latest in a long line of people to have proposed such a party. Since parting ways with his former boss, Chapman has been announcing to apparently anyone who will listen that he intends to set up a new party – ‘The Democrats’ – which will function as a pro-European centrist party.
Chapman might be a slightly odd character (his Twitter feed suggests a man suffering the effects of too much Mediterranean sun and too little caution) but the concept of a new centrist party isn’t altogether a strange one.
The main stimulus, of course is Brexit, something which has altered – perhaps perpetually – the political calculus of the country. We are no longer a nation defined by our attitudes to economic issues; we are one defined by our position vis a vis globalisation. On one side sit the 52% – against the European Union, immigration and neoliberal politics. On the other are the 48%, supportive of international trade and the free flows of capital and people.
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, however, a curious thing took place. In their haste to win votes, both Labour and the Conservatives positioned themselves firmly on the side of the thin majority who voted in favour of Brexit. Both parties deposed their leadership in favour of figures opposed to internationalism (Jeremy Corbyn, whatever his youthful fanbase might believe, is and has always been a trenchant nationalist and opponent of the European Union) and have enthusiastically courted former Leave voters.
But if Britain’s political realignment saw the creation of a political coalition united by its opposition to globalisation, the entailment of that was the creation of another one, one which defines itself in terms of a positive attitude to neoliberalism. Yet this demographic has been almost completely neglected by both major parties. Corbyn’s Labour Party professes a neo-socialist programme taken directly from the 1970s, while the Tories have opted to pursue a rock-hard Brexit (though whether they’ll get it, considering the sluggish state of negotiations and the reluctance of the European Commission to compromise, is as yet unclear.)
This leaves a large pro-globalisation lacuna in the political landscape. Who can fill it? Some have suggested the Liberal Democrats, but this seems unlikely. Their brand has been irreversibly tainted by their decision to go into coalition with the Tories in 2010, and the few electoral successes they enjoyed in 2017 came not from their pro-European agitation but from what they’ve always been best at – locally-focussed campaigns won through intense canvassing.
If not the Lib Dems, does this leave room for a new centrist party – of the sort suggested by Chapman – to enter the scene? Contrary to the somewhat febrile speculation of many commentators, some of whom seem in need of something to write about during the long hot summer, this seems unlikely.
Firstly, it relies upon the assumption that all of the 48% of the electorate who opposed Brexit are ideologically internationalist. This is as mistaken as presuming that that all of the 52% of the country who supported Brexit are swivel-eyed bigots. Whilst at least some of those 48% are, many more are the economically cautious; those who voted to Remain out of an innate reluctance to jump into the void. The small cadre of hardcore Remainers do not constitute enough of a pool to form a new party of.
Secondly, it mistakes internationalism for centrism. Indeed, this difference has been elided over by multiple commentators online, who assume that a centrist party is per se going to be internationalist. Genuinely centrist parties in the past have been grounded on economic centrism; that is to say, fairly high government spending and a fairly equitable tax burden.
None of this is compatible with the brand of internationalism being espoused by those encouraging a third party; returning to the European Union would, for a variety of reasons, require adherence to the ‘German model’ of economics, one which would see spending cut and foreign labour permitted entry to the country. Theoretically an internationalist party might achieve limited success in certain areas; but it would be unable to capitalise on the potential that true centrism holds.
This leads to the final reason for the likely failure of a new third party, namely the deeply entrenched political differences that transcend the pro-globalisation/anti-globalisation dichotomy. Profound differences exist between left-wing and right-wing internationalists, both in their attitudes towards internationalism and in their stances on various other issues.
Indeed, it could almost be argued that the gulf between right-wing internationalism and left-wing internationalism is almost as profound and impassable as the one between parochialism and globalism. A centrist party would have to find a way to reconcile wildly different positions on issues like defence, non-European migration, civil liberties and the environment.
This all highlights a problem with the basic premise of Chapman’s; that a party can be founded upon an issue. UKIP tried that, and it didn’t work – after essentially exhausting the mileage that could be made out of Europe, they’ve been reduced to a risible fringe movement of nutcases and Islamophobes. Parties shouldn’t be founded upon policies; they should be founded upon ideologies.
So it is with both the Conservatives and Labour (and indeed, to their credit, the Lib Dems.) The Conservatives are not a party of low immigration or monetarist policy; they are a party which believes in the concept of hierarchy, of the inevitability of inequality, and of the importance of incremental societal evolution. Similarly, Labour is a party which is rooted in a belief in the importance of trade unionism and of egalitarianism.
Deprived of such an animating spirit, a centrist or internationalist third party cannot hope to thrive. At best it will succeed in agitating enough to make its voice heard – which may well be enough to accomplish its goals – but in reality a third party of this sort has no hope. If James Chapman wants to stop or to mitigate Brexit, a new party isn’t the answer.
Much – too much, probably – has been written about why liberalism seemed to fail in 2016. None of it is particularly convincing. That’s not to say it’s worthless – it’s not. But whilst each of the explanations has been true, none has been both necessary and sufficient. In reality, it will take many decades – centuries, perhaps – before an intelligible and explanatory narrative can be found for the events of 2016.
That doesn’t mean that, in the here and now, we can’t react. In fact it is absolutely imperative that liberals regroup and prepare to mobilise against the forces of reaction and anti-modernity. The alternative is unthinkable; to simply surrender and watch as the 1930s repeat themselves.
But if liberalism is to go on the offensive, it needs to arm itself with a coherent ideology that can compete with the numerous anti-liberal ideologies presently ascendant. The failure to articulate such an ideology was one of the key reasons that this present period of liberalism came to an end. Far too often it seemed that the liberalism of Blair and Obama was an ad hoc menu of policies rather than a philosophy; a confused jumble of ideas with little in common.
The (perhaps inevitable) result of this was that liberalism began to be perceived as little more than a façade, merely a byword for pragmatic politics. And therefore, when the tides turned and liberalism no longer delivered prosperity (i.e. after the financial crash of 2008-9) there was no longer a valid case for it. Liberalism had predicated itself solely upon ensuring prosperity, and as such it provided no convincing reason to support it when that prosperity was gone.
In the void left by the collapse of liberal hegemony, both the far right and the far left have sought to take its’ place. Both despise liberal values, and have spent much of the last sixty years waiting to attack them. Though they (clearly) differ greatly from each other, they have shown themselves to be willing to co-operate in their attacks upon liberalism. It is this grotesque coalition – pairing Edward Snowden with Vladimir Putin, Jean-Luc Melenchon with Marine Le Pen – who liberalism must confront, if it is to ensure that liberal society can survive the next few years.
In light of all this, I propose a new paradigm for liberalism. I have provisionally named it New Liberalism – it seems the most appropriate name for an ideology which clearly follows in the tradition of liberalism, whilst seeking to distinguish itself from older and flawed versions of it. New Liberalism is not a political party or movement; nor is it even a platform of policies. It is against the essence of liberalism that it be ossified and turned into a single entity. Instead, New Liberalism is a series of principles – ten, to be precise – that I suggest should underlie liberal thought in the coming years.
- New Liberalism is the belief that a better future for all humans is possible, and that we have a moral obligation to actualise it.
- New Liberalism seeks social harmony, whether between classes, between genders, or between ethnicities.
- New Liberalism is respectful of cultural difference, but demands adherence to liberal values as a prerequisite of toleration.
- New Liberalism supports a gradual progression towards transnational integration, whilst acknowledging that nation-states and national identities will not disappear until a popular will exists for them to do so.
- New Liberalism embraces the principles of free trade and economic neoliberalism, but accepts that mistakes have been made in the implementation of both, and resolves to learn from them.
- New Liberalism rejects majoritarianism and demagoguery. It is predicated in consensus politics and concern for the interests of all citizens.
- New Liberalism seeks to build links between the left-wing and right-wing based on shared commitments to the ideals of liberalism.
- New Liberalism is a broad church; it is not dogmatic, nor is it monolithic. There is room for considerable debate and discourse within it.
- New Liberalism values the rule of law and adherence to established methods of governance, eschewing populist demagoguery.
- New Liberalism is a muscular and evangelical ideology, insofar as it seeks to propagate itself around the world. It is unafraid to confront anti-liberal ideologies situated anywhere on the political spectrum.
These principles are both broad and narrow. They are broad, insofar as they are not ostensibly a commitment to any specific policies. But they are narrow, inasmuch as commitment to these principles will inevitably preclude many policies. This is intentional. New Liberalism is, as (8) says, not a monolithic entity. One can be a Conservative or a Liberal Democrat or a Labour member, and also a New Liberal. It is an ideology which seeks to occupy the areas of intersection between all these parties. This area is not homogenous; there is plenty of debate to be had. But the foundational premises of this political space are not challenged.
They are also intentionally antagonistic to the far right and allied movements. Far right policies cannot conceivably be actualised in a state governed along New Liberal principles. The aspirations to equality and freedom inherent in them is repugnant to the far right. But equally these principles – particularly the unapologetic defence of the free market – are unconscionable to a far left movement.
This is not a pick-and-mix ideology. New Liberalism must be taken in its’ entirety, or not at all. The principles support each other, and indeed are all necessary consequences of the first one. Ideological flexibility – and the appearance of sly pragmatism – was the downfall of the last wave of liberalism. As such the people will respect an ideology which retains its basic principles, rather than selectively discarding them based on what seems to gain votes.
At heart New Liberalism is a reformulation of historical liberalism, one which is cognizant of its’ mistakes as well as its strengths. It recognises that liberalism failed to ensure economic stability through a variety of ill-considered policies. It recognises that mass immigration from non-Western countries has been a varied narrative, one which many are unconvinced about. It is aware of the problems of cronyism and corruption that have often afflicted liberalism before. And it promises to work towards eliminating them, whilst retaining the principles of liberalism.
Will it work? Who knows. Every ideology hubristically assumes that it is ‘right’, and history informs us that so far none has succeeded. But I do not intend to posit New Liberalism as an ideology that will last mankind till the end of time, as some kind of watertight belief system. It is specifically intended to combat far-left and far-right extremism in Europe and America. As far as this goal is concerned, it seems a beginning, at least – whilst it may not succeed in defeating the massed ranks of the radicals, it provides a platform around which opposition can rally. It plays to the strengths of liberalism, whilst reinvigorating it with new life.
The election of Alexander Van Der Bellen in Austria proves that, contrary to the wishes of its premature obituarists, liberalism is not yet dead. So too does the nomination of Sevil Shhaideh – a Muslim woman – as President of Romania, and the apparent setbacks for Marine Le Pen in France. But as liberals we must not be complacent. At any moment the situation may worsen for liberals; we must be prepared to respond.
The war is on, the armies are being massed. Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 9th will herald the beginning of open combat; another battle may well happen in the run-up to the French Presidential election in Spring of 2017. There will be many more such. But with a standard to act as a rallying-post, liberalism may not be lost.
Much has been made in recent days about the alleged idiocy of colonial strategists in drawing flawed boundaries in the Middle East which are now the cause of the present bloodshed. This is patently a ridiculous explanation; the boundaries were not in fact drawn ‘at whim’, but structured carefully and with a great deal of thought, to the extent that the British and French nearly came to blows over the exact position of a boundary marker in the Syrian desert near Palmyra. Moreover, blaming boundaries for sectarian bloodshed seems uncomfortably close to exonerating the perpetrators of the mayhem. Whilst it may be in vogue amongst the left to indulge in historical self-flagellation and blame imperialism for all the world’s ailments, the reality is that having a multi-ethnic society in no way necessarily leads to civil war. Dozens of countries, from India to Belgium, have religiously and ethnically pluralistic societies who get along perfectly well. The boundaries drawn in the Middle East are actually remarkably good at preventing the persecution of minority groups and reducing the danger posed by ethnic confusion.
But still many now point to partition along ethno-religious grounds as the cure to Iraq’s woes, a sort of variation on the ‘Iron Wall’ speech of Ze’ev Jabotinsky – if two groups simply refuse to co-exist, the only solution is to separate them absolutely. The current belief is that the partition of Iraq is either a fait accompli or imminent, and that it should be encouraged; a Kurdish state encompassing the north, a ‘Sunnistan’ in the vast central belt possibly linked to contiguous areas of Syria, and finally the Shi’a state in the south. The belief is that hastening the inevitable partition will be the best solution to the Sunni insurgency, and prevent a repeat of the sectarian insurgency which plagued Iraq during the last decade.
Such a solution sounds both simple and attractive, but on further examination is neither of those things. In fact, the territorial integrity of Iraq is vital to the future security of the region and of the world at large. The first reason for this lies in the impossibility of a ‘clean’ partition. The confessional outlook of Iraq has been grossly oversimplified by the media, to the point where many simply assume there is simply a line in the sand with Shi’as on one side and Sunnis on the other. In reality the boundary is convoluted, vague and blurred. Any attempt at drawing a line of division will inevitably mean leaving a huge minority population within a foreign state – Sunnis in a Shi’a state and vice versa. The fate of such populations will not be enviable judging by Iraq’s previous treatment of minorities. Conversely, they will remain a constant thorn in the flesh of their host nation, being a potentially dangerous minority in the dangerous border regions of both states. So what to do with them? Population transfer is almost never successful; the Israel-Palestine conflict shows that the populations being transferred almost never want to go, and are generally forced out at gunpoint with little or no compensation, and only memories of their former homes. Meanwhile the sorry tale of the Sudetenland shows the danger of leaving minorities in situ; the likelihood is that they will indeed form a fifth column undermining the state. Finally, even if some solution to minorities could be found, a thornier issue would emerge; irredentism. In a region in which natural resources are the difference between poverty and untold wealth, the exact placement of a border post could become a dispute which could easily turn into a war. Yet it remains entirely uncertain exactly where a border would be located, and any line of division imposed upon Iraq would become a point of extreme tension and potentially war, much like Kashmir is fought over between India and Pakistan. Far from simplifying the regions’ problems, partition would simply exacerbate them.
Secondly, the partition would not favour the Sunni state. Kurdistan is amply provided with huge mineral and petrochemical wealth (especially after its’ recent conquest); the Shi’a south holds some of the largest oil reserves in the world. However, the Sunni state will mainly consist of nothing but desert – hot, flat, featureless desert. Moreover, it would also be landlocked, a sure recipe for disaster. Partition would turn the Sunni portion of Iraq into an impoverished wasteland, with very little to trade and nowhere to trade it from as a result of its’ landlocked nature. Poverty would lead to resentment, and resentment to political instability; by creating a homogenously Sunni state, partition would in fact result in a volatile state which will almost inevitably turn into an incubator for terror. It would be al-Qaeda’s wet dream, so to speak; an abandoned country full of recruits and with a government thoroughly in sympathy with terrorism and willing to enforce Islamist policies upon the populace. Partition would lead inevitably to Sunni Iraq becoming another Afghanistan, and that is not an appealing prospect for the world. Already we have seen radicalised European Muslims return home from ISIL territory to commit acts of terror against Western targets, such as the heinous attack at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. It is imperative that Iraq cannot become a training camp for more such terrorists.
The next reason for opposing partition stems from the fact that partition is a surrender. If we accept the ‘facts on the ground’ through partition, we will lend legitimacy to ISIL, an organisation which has none. Not only are ISIL a terrorist organisation allied to al-Qaeda and thoroughly supportive of attacks against Western targets, but their human rights record is frankly appalling. In Syria they have revived such medieval practises as crucifixions and floggings, and are busy imposing a particularly unpleasant version of Sharia law upon their latest conquests in Iraq. Women are beaten up for walking in public without a veil; Christians are threatened with death unless they pay a protection tax, the jizya. ISIL cannot be accepted or legitimised, but partition will do both of these things. The de facto rulers of Sunni Iraq at present are ISIL, and thus it stands to reason that partition will result in ISIL being the transitional government of the area. But the majority of Sunnis are not terrorists and have no sympathy with ISIL, regarding them as repressive terrorists – it would be immoral and unjust to deliver them into the hands of the group for convenience’s sake. Partition is unthinkable entirely until ISIL have been vanquished; only then can consideration of political autonomy for Iraq’s Sunni minority be discussed.
Finally, the partition of Iraq would create a mosaic of satellite states which would increase regional tensions intolerably. Each of the key nations comprising Iraq – Kurds, Turkmen, Sunnis and Shi’as – are in reality supported and backed by powerful foreign allies. Currently their political union prevents this support from turning violent, but if the three constituent nations were to split then tensions amongst their supporters would escalate uncontrollably. Iraq’s Sunni populace are already supported by the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and partition would lead to ‘Sunnistan’ becoming a Saudi protectorate dominated by Wahhabi fanatics. Meanwhile the Shi’a rump state would then become increasingly aligned with Iran, viewing it as the natural leader of the Shi’a world. We would then be in the unenviable position of having an Iranian satellite state and a Saudi satellite state abutting each other. The two countries do not hold each other in high regard; in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that they loathe each other. Partition, however, would put Iran and Saudi Arabia right next to each other, effectively. This would be a nightmare scenario; the two most formidable armies in the region attacking each other in a Mesopotamian battlefield. Meanwhile the Iraqi Turkmens remain tied intimately to Turkey proper; the Kurds on the other hand are traditional allies of Israel. Turkey, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia all jockeying for influence over the wealth and strategic importance of Iraq would be catastrophic, and cannot be allowed to happen. The only way that this could be prevented is by maintaining Iraq’s union, and thus enabling it to act as an independent and autonomous entity rather than being forced into seeking alliances with bigger powers.
Partition is unthinkable, now or ever. Iraq must remain a single unit, for the sake of the region. But it is also evident that the current status quo is also unacceptable. The ISIL insurgency is, we recall, a direct consequence of al-Maliki’s corruption and sectarian bias, which in turn is a result of Saddam Hussein’s discrimination and persecution of Shi’as. A new ethno-religious settlement must be found in which each of Iraq’s nations can achieve genuine autonomy within a single strategic framework, and the optimum solution lies in a confederal structure. Even looser than the federalism posited by some, this would turn Iraq into four states which have total political independence (n.b. the fourth state would be a Christian region in the Nineveh plains). However, these four states would be united in a single foreign policy, a single non-sectarian military, and a single monetary policy. Efforts would be made to co-ordinate other matters, and to increase co-operation between states; nonetheless, the states would be independent in everything other than the above. A confederal solution has the advantage of satisfying the legitimate concerns of all the groups in Iraq, whilst keeping it united politically. There will be no issue of minorities in a confederal Iraq, as minorities would be protected by the single confederal constitution; similarly confederalism would not allow any state to turn into an incubator for terror, by maintaining a single army. Most importantly, however, the united and monolithic foreign policy would prevent parts of Iraq from becoming dominated by other nations. Iraq would remain as a buffer between the Gulf and Iran, thus maintaining the uneasy peace between the two great powers.